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Resum
Aquest article analitza, centrant-se en els aspectes econòmics 
de les indústries audiovisuals, algunes de les principals iniciati-
ves polítiques de la UE que afecten el sector –la Directiva sobre 
serveis de mitjans audiovisuals, el programa MEDIA, la compe-
tència i els ajuts estatals per al servei públic de radiotelevisió, 
així com la propietat dels mitjans i el pluralisme– en el context 
de l’evolució tecnològica i l’evolució dels mercats a Europa. Es 
pot destacar que les ambicions polítiques entorn dels mitjans 
audiovisuals són molt variades i no sempre van en la matei-
xa direcció. L’article examina les amenaces i les oportunitats 
ocasionades per la digitalització i per les noves configuracions 
de la cadena de valor, però sosté que les agendes en conflicte 
continuen sent un desafiament fonamental per formular políti-
ques en l’àmbit de la Unió Europea.
Paraules clau
Economia audiovisual, digitalització, política de l’Unió Europea, 
competència, pluralisme.
Abstract
Focusing on economic aspects of audiovisual industries, this 
article analyses some of the key EU policy initiatives affecting 
the sector –the AVMS Directive; the MEDIA Programme; com-
petition and state aid for PSB; and also media ownership and 
pluralism– in the context of changing technologies and chang-
ing markets in Europe.  It is notable that the policy ambitions 
surrounding audiovisual media are varied and do not always 
pull in the same direction. This article examines the threats 
and opportunities caused by digitisation and new value chain 
configurations but argues that conflicting agendas remain a 
substantive challenge for policy-making at EU level.
Keywords
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pluralism.
Introduction
According to the European Commission, “the single European 
market is one of the biggest achievements of European inte-
gration, and applies to television broadcasts as anything else” 
(CEC, 2007a: 8).  Yet, as evidenced by a worsening trade deficit 
between the US and Europe, many audiovisual production and 
distribution businesses within Europe remain relatively frag-
mented and under-capitalised and struggle to compete inter-
nationally.  This article focuses on key elements of audiovisual 
policy - the Audiovisual Media Services Directive; the MEDIA 
Programme; competition and state aid for PSB; and also media 
ownership and pluralism – in the context of changing technolo-
gies and changing markets in Europe. It examines the threats 
and opportunities caused by digitisation and new value chain 
configurations, but argues that conflicting agendas surrounding 
audiovisual media remain a substantive challenge for policy-
making at EU level.
Audiovisual refers to television production and television 
broadcasting plus film and is an area that has attracted some 
quite active policy-making at European level over recent dec-
ades. Any close reading of the policy documents, speeches and 
statements that have emerged from differing DGs of the Com-
mission over the years on audiovisual-related issues confirms 
that certain core themes tend to recur with great regularity. 
One abiding concern is the competitiveness of European au-
diovisual industries and the need for a legislative framework 
that maximises “economic growth and the potential creation of 
jobs” (Europa 2005).  But the cultural and social dimensions of 
audiovisual are also recognised. Culture is regarded as a vital 
asset and so, as argued by the EC Vice-President for the Digital 
Agenda, “it is essential that our cultural diversity must be de-
fended tooth and claw (bec et ongles)” (Kroes 2010). 
Audiovisual media are regarded as an economic growth area 
(KEA 2006: 115). Audiovisual is a key component of “cultural 
and creative industries” and, in the context of the Lisbon 2010 
framework, was seen as important catalyst for wider economic 
growth (CEC 2007a). Likewise audiovisual, as a component of 
what is now termed the “digital economy”, is embued with high 
hopes of how it may contribute to the “Europe 2020” strat-
egy of economic revitalisation and growth (Barber 2010, CEC 
2010a; 2010c). The audiovisual sector “directly employs over 
(15-24)
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one million people in the EU” (CEC 2011a) and so is seen as 
an important sector for Europe in economic terms (i.e. employ-
ment, opportunities for wealth creation etc). So one concern ev-
ident in EU policy documents and statements is a wish to foster 
the development of strong European players that can compete 
more effectively against the strength of audiovisual suppliers 
from the US and elsewhere.
But, as well as creating prosperity, the role that cultural sec-
tors such as film and television play in sustaining identities and 
promoting tolerance and social cohesiveness is well recognised 
at European level (CEC 2007a: 2). One of the aspirations that 
surfaces fairly regularly in policy documents is that of safeguard-
ing indigenous European languages and cultures. Also there is 
the desire to promote pluralism and diversity. Audiovisual media 
are key to these sorts of policy aims too. 
So, the ambitions surrounding policies for audiovisual media 
are varied and they do not always pull in the same direction. 
But, to some extent, the array of priorities and wishes shap-
ing audiovisual policy simply reflect the wider purposes that 
lie behind the creation of the EU in the first place which are, 
also, somewhat multi-sided. The motivation for Union within 
Europe is in part political and based around a fundamental de-
sire to stop European neighbours going to war with each other. 
However, the wish to create a common or a single market - to 
make all Member States partners (rather than competitors) in a 
collective trading block  - has also been driven by economics. 
“Europe” is very much inspired by the economic and commer-
cial benefits that may be garnered from expanded markets and 
the economies of scale they bring. 
A key feature of the economics of supplying television is the 
presence of economies of scale which, in turn, stems from the 
unusual ‘public good’ characteristics of broadcast output (Doyle 
2002a: 1-14). And, because of the potential to exploit inherent 
economies of scale, the prospect of an enlarged collective mar-
ket for audiovisual products and services across Europe appears 
to hold out great promise, as acknowledged by DG Information 
Society and Media (CEC 2007a: 2):
“National boundaries must … be crossed if Europe’s digital 
content industry is to benefit from single market economies of 
scale”
But, despite globalisation, despite growth of the internet and 
despite success on the part of the Commission in sweeping 
away legislative barriers to the free circulation of broadcast 
and audiovisual services across member state boundaries, we 
seem no closer now to a “single” market in audiovisual than we 
were when the Broadcasting Directive was first agreed back in 
1989.   Cultural and linguistic variations across Europe provide 
a major part of the explanation for this. Far from moving to-
wards a single market, European audiences have splintered and 
fragmentated as new technologies have multiplied the available 
avenues for distribution. It is notable too that US-made rather 
than European work predominates in cross-border circulation of 
audiovisual content (EAO 2009: 164). 
Focusing on economic aspects of some of the key EU policy 
initiatives affecting the audiovisual sector, this chapter explores 
the issues testing the Commission as it intervenes in this area. 
Changing technology represents one such issue but an enduring 
challenge stems from the tensions and conflicts that have long 
characterised the history of EU interventions in the audiovisual 
arena.  
Changing technology
The nature of broadcasting is such that it has traditionally been 
regulated quite differently from other sectors. One reason for 
special treatment relates to the “public good” characteristics of 
broadcast output and the non-excludable and non-rivalrous na-
ture of broadcast output which meant that, in the first instance, 
conventional methods of market support (i.e. direct viewer  pay-
ments) would not have worked so an alternative funding system 
was needed. Another source of market failure in broadcast-
ing stems from “externalities” –the negative effects imposed 
on society at large by supplying excessive amounts of content 
that is harmful (e.g. violent programming) or, conversely, the 
positive external effects of supplying the sort of content that 
benefits everyone. The misalignment between private costs (to 
the broadcaster) and social costs in broadcasting constitutes a 
market failure because it encourages the under-supply of some 
categories of output and over-supply of others that may engen-
der negative externalities. And yet another concern with unregu-
lated broadcasting markets is that, because of the presence of 
economies of scale, there is a tendency towards enlargement 
and  accumulation of monopoly power (Doyle 2002a: 161-3).
The economic justification for regulation of broadcasting has 
become more questionable as new technologies have addressed 
some of these sources of market failure (Armstrong 2005). 
Thanks to cable and satellite, digital compression techniques 
and steady improvements in the underlying architecture of the 
internet as a means of delivering audiovisual content, spectrum 
scarcity has now given way to an era in which avenues for dis-
tribution of content are abundant.   In addition, while advertis-
ing was the main source of market funding for broadcasting 
in the past, advances in encryption technology have allowed 
direct payments to emerge as an increasingly important stream 
of support for television. The spread of direct viewer payments 
implies that a well-functioning market in which allocation is de-
termined by the forces of demand and supply has become more 
feasible. So, since viewers can now pay for what they want, the 
case in favour of publicly funded broadcasting or in favour of 
“distorted” funding mechanisms such as a universal tax to pay 
for television content is less compelling (Elstein 2004). 
However, despite new technologies, there are still several ways 
in which it way be argued that an unregulated market would not 
allocate resources efficiently (Hargreave Heaps 2005).  Cer-
tain forms of output that are widely seen as desirable and that 
confer positive externalities (e.g. educational programming; 
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arts and cultural output) are likely to undersupplied because, 
although this output contributes to the collective welfare of soci-
ety, viewers on an individual basis may not be willing to tune in 
or pay for it in sufficient numbers to warrant the production and 
supply of it. And, in the absence of regulation, the tendency for 
television content that creates negative externalities to be over-
supplied will still persist (Graham 1999). Even though we have 
many more channels and direct viewer payments, a free market 
may not supply viewers with what they want.
So it is widely (though not universally) accepted that, where 
audiovisual is concerned, interventions are still needed to coun-
teract deficiencies arising from the free operation of markets. 
Intervention is needed, on economic grounds, to tackle market 
failures and the problem of externalities as well as to restrict 
the exercise of monopoly power by broadcasters.   In addition, 
governments often intervene in broadcasting for non-economic 
reasons, though these are not the main focus here. The tools 
used most frequently to address market failures in broadcasting 
are public ownership (i.e. organising provision through state-
owned entities such as the BBC) and regulation (i.e. encourag-
ing private broadcasters to meet public requirements regarding 
content even where this means deviating from profit maximising 
behaviour). 
However, the context in which regulation of broadcasting is 
taking place has changed dramatically. Helped along by pro-
gressive improvements in digital compression techniques, we 
have arrived in an era of so-called spectrum “plenty”. And, com-
bined with the support offered by pay-TV, a proliferation of new 
distribution channels has brought many new competitors into 
markets for production and supply of audiovisual content. In the 
era of spectrum scarcity which prevailed until the 1980s, the 
role played by state authorities in awarding and renewing broad-
casting licenses placed them in a powerful position in relation 
to determining who would have access to the airwaves and in 
controlling content. Nowadays, airwaves remain a precious na-
tional resource but as avenues for distribution have multiplied 
(and many now extend across national borders) broadcasting 
regulators are faced with some serious new challenges. 
Although changing technology has generally served to open 
up broadcasting markets, in some cases new entry barriers 
have arrived caused by gateway monopolies – i.e. monopolists 
controlling the “gateway” between the broadcast or other sup-
plier of audiovisual content and audiences (Cowie and Marsden 
1999). One example of a gateway which might be monopolised 
is electronic programme guides (EPGs) - the navigation systems 
that viewers need as we get more and more channels, thanks 
to digital. UK regulator Ofcom, in introducing a code governing 
fair access to EPGs in 2004, acknowledged that “discriminatory 
treatment of a channel in terms of listings or presentation would 
constrain its ability to compete effectively with other channels 
for audience share and advertising revenue, and would thus be 
prejudicial to fair and effective competition” (Ofcom 2004:10). 
Another example would be control over the audiovisual media 
experience on mobile devices. As we progress towards having 
more and more of our media and communications supplied to 
us either via a single hub or black box in the home or on the 
move via mobile devices, it is inevitable that more market power 
will be invested in the hands of owners of the management sys-
tems and navigation interfaces that steer us towards one set of 
content rather than another. 
Growing use of the internet as an access point for media con-
tent has encouraged the development of a new generation of 
online players such as content aggregators, social networking 
sites and search engines who now have significant power to 
shape media choices and, in turn, consumption patterns. So, 
a major challenge for regulators is to recognize and address 
bottlenecks and monopolisation of gateways and access points 
so as to ensure well-functioning markets and the fair and open 
competition needed to sustain efficiency in the audiovisual in-
dustry.
Disintermediation is another phenomenon of the digital era 
which, on account of its potential to disrupt investment in me-
dia content production, is of potential concern for regulators. 
Advertising is an important source of support for many televi-
sion broadcasters. But growth of the internet has encouraged 
a switch in patterns of investment by advertisers away from 
conventional media – especially newspapers and magazines 
but also including broadcasting.  In 2009, some 27% of total 
advertising expenditure in the UK was accounted for by the in-
ternet, compared with just 1% a decade earlier (Ofcom 2010; 
AA/WARC 2009). It may be argued that the migration of audi-
ence attention and of advertising towards a new medium and 
away from others is really nothing new. For Schumpeter (1942), 
the process whereby some firms seize opportunities to innovate 
and profit from technological change while slow-footed market 
incumbents who fail to adapt lose ground and perhaps go out of 
business is not only natural but also a positive driver of growth 
in the economy. To the extent that what is taking place in the 
media sector at present conforms with this notion of “creative 
destruction” then it is fair to argue that public policy should not 
impede its progress. But what if the process at work is, as some 
have suggested (Liebowitz 2006), one of just “destructive” de-
struction rather than creative destruction?
Just as radio took audiences from newspapers and television 
took audiences from radio, the internet is taking audiences from 
other media. And naturally advertisers want to capitalize on the 
new consumption trends by investing more in the internet. As 
new platforms and delivery formats arrive and take over from 
old ones, the investment that advertisers are willing to make 
in media content ought to settle into new patterns supporting 
the more innovative new products and services or modes of 
delivery. But what happens when, instead of being reallocated 
towards new forms of content, advertising is simply siphoned 
off by intermediaries who are not investing anything in content 
creation? A problem that has hit the newspaper publishing in-
dustry hard and is also affecting audiovisual suppliers is that, 
where audience attention is monetized by a third party (e.g. 
an aggregator or search engine), there is less subsidy available 
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from advertisers to support content production and to constrain 
the direct charge to consumers. To the detriment of consumers 
as well as suppliers of content, disintermediation places down-
ward pressure on the revenues needed to renew, improve and 
replenish the available stock of professionally crafted audiovisu-
al and other media content.
Digitisation and growth of the internet have greatly added to 
the complexity of regulating audiovisual industries not only on 
account of the ways these developments have disrupted the 
value chain and transformed the interactions between suppli-
ers and audiences but also because of how they have engen-
dered more cross-border spillage of audiovisual products and 
services. In Europe a number of cross-frontier issues have have 
cropped up, for example, in relation to content, technological 
standards and copyright. At times this has sparked controversy 
about the level – whether national or EU – at which audiovisual 
regulation ought to be taking place. One prominent example of 
a cross-frontier issue has been the Murphy case where a pub 
landlady in the UK, rather than paying high tariffs to BSkyB, 
instead chose to show English Premier League games using an 
imported satellite card from a Greek broadcaster and, in 2006, 
was fined £6,000 by a UK court for breach of copyright. When 
the case was appealed at European level, the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), rather than upholding the national position, 
instead recommended a ruling in favour of the landlady (Fenton 
and Blitz 2011). The ECJ’s reluctance to penalise re-transmis-
sion of services across European frontiers may be understanda-
ble, but on the other hand the prospect that audiovisual content 
owners may find it difficult in future to market their rights on a 
territory-by-territory basis has quite far-reaching commercial im-
plications. The controversy engendered by the Murphy case un-
derlines the potential, in an era of ever improving infrastructures 
for transfrontier distribution of audiovisual, for new regulatory 
dilemmas and for conflict between national and European-level 
intervention in audiovisual regulation. 
Challenges for Regulation
The ways that historic conflicts and new technologies and mar-
ket circumstances bear upon the economic regulation of au-
diovisual industries can be seen by examining some of the key 
elements of European audiovisual policy. This section provides 
a brief critical analysis of four important aspects of European 
regulation in relation to audiovisual: the AVMS directive; the 
MEDIA programme; competition and state aid for Public Service 
Broadcasters; and ownership and pluralism.
The Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Directive
The key EU broadcasting policy initiative so far has been Tel-
evision without Frontiers (TVWF), a Directive on broadcasting 
first agreed by Member States in 1989 and that has since been 
updated and replaced by the AVMS Directive 2007. The general 
aim behind TVWF was to ensure that broadcast service provid-
ers can take advantage of the single European market (SEM) by 
being legally able to operate across frontiers in much the same 
way as service providers in any other industry. So, one of the 
fundamental principles of TVWF has been that broadcast ser-
vices should comply with one and only one national law, i.e. the 
law of the national state from which they “originate”. Then, they 
should be free to circulate in all the Member States of the EU. 
But this requires compliance with a minimum set of common 
rules and standards and it these common rules – in the areas of 
content quotas, right to reply, protection of minors, advertising 
and sponsorship - that are set out in the Directive. Any channel 
licenced within an EU country and that complies with the mini-
mum standards laid out in the Directive cannot then be blocked 
in another Member State. 
When TVWF was reviewed after its first few years in opera-
tion, the process became mired in controversy about the in-
digenous European content quota: the requirement within the 
Directive which applies to all European broadcasters and says 
that at least 50% of transmission time needs to be reserved for 
works made in Europe. That conflict about how best to revise 
the European quota reflected a sort of contradiction that lies 
at the heart of media-related policy-making in Europe and that 
was exemplified in the TVWF Directive. On the one hand, lib-
eralization is an important goal – removing barriers and scaling 
back “red tape” – because liberalisation is seen as the best 
means to foster growth, employment and commercial success 
in the European audiovisual industry. So the primary purpose 
of TVWF was to remove barriers to the cross-border flow of 
television. But at the same time, there is also a strong impetus 
towards intervention in the free market to protect European au-
diovisual content production, and this more dirigiste impulse is 
reflected in the compulsory 50% European content quota that 
forms part of TVWF (and latterly the AVMS Directive). TVWF 
reflects a clash between both the ambition to liberalise and the 
impulse to protect (Collins 1994).
The introduction of a new directive on AVMS in 2007 to re-
place TVWF was a direct response to changing technologies. 
Whereas TVWF was agreed at a time when there were only 47 
television channels in the European Union, by 2005 the number 
of licenced channels across Europe was in the thousands. In 
addition, digital convergence and the arrival and growth of the 
internet had added new ways to distribute and consume tel-
evision content.  As well as as traditional “point-to-multipoint” 
scheduled broadcast services, viewers could now also receive 
a wide array of “one-to-one” or non-scheduled television con-
tent services – e.g. web-based on-demand services. The Com-
mission was keen for European regulation to keep abreast of 
technology and so wanted to create ‘a level playing field’ and 
a platform-neutral approach for all audiovisual media services 
by, for the first time, bringing on-demand or ‘one-to-one’ televi-
sion services within the scope of TVWF (CEC 2007b: 3).   It 
wanted to extend regulation of television content to cover non-
scheduled services as well as scheduled services. 
There was, however, awareness that new audiovisual content 
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services (where the viewer has much more control over what is 
being received, where and when) are in some ways quite dif-
ferent from conventional scheduled broadcast services (where 
the viewer is a passive recipient). For the Commission, this 
distinction warranted a differentiated or two-tier approach to 
regulation of content. So, in the case of conventional broadcast 
services, the same sort of rules that applied under TVWF (on 
protection of minors, right of reply, quotas, etc) still apply today 
under the new AVMS Directive agreed in 2007. However non-
linear services are subject to a reduced basic tier of regulation 
that, for example, excludes compulsory quotas for European-
made content. 
The new AVMS Directive can and has been criticised from a 
number of standpoints. One deficiency is that an approach in 
which some television content services are more lightly regu-
lated than others hardly seems to constitute the “level playing 
field” the revised legislation was intended to provide. However 
the adoption of a two-tier approach was a necessary response 
to another set of concerns. Many influential voices in industry 
argued that extending the scope of EU regulation of audiovisual 
from broadcasting to include the internet was excessively diri-
giste and would be harmful (MacKenzie 2006). Imposing the 
same rules on non-linear television services as apply to conven-
tional broadcasters would create uncertainty, add to industry’s 
costs, and hold back investment in new media services, there-
by placing European players at a disadvantage next to rivals 
from US and Japan. So a two-tier approach seemed to find the 
right balance. But in other quarters the revised Directive was 
viewed as being too liberal in its approach. Alongside alter-
ing the definition of broadcasting, another notable change was 
that the 2007 Directive relaxed some of the earlier restrictions 
on advertising and product placement that had been contained 
in TVWF. For some, the AVMS Directive was too concerned 
with de-regulation and with supporting industry and commerce 
and not sufficiently attuned to issues of culture and citizenship 
(Wheeler 2007).
The MEDIA Programme
As well as the AVMS Directive, the other main plank of Euro-
pean policy on audiovisual content consists of direct interven-
tions established by the Commission to try and help support 
indigenous production and and to promote wider circulation of 
European-made works throughout the SEM. The MEDIA Pro-
gramme which started back in the late 1980s and has since 
gone through a number of reincarnations has consisted of sever-
al funding schemes offering support for activities including train-
ing, script development, production and distribution. Although 
the amount invested in the Programme has increased over time, 
its overall level of funding remains quite limited bearing in mind 
the high cost of audiovisual production and the large number of 
Member States the programme is seeking to support.  The cur-
rent allocation of €755m to Media 2007-2013 works out at just 
€4m per Member State per year (CEC 2011b). However, a more 
glaring weakness with the MEDIA Programme – one that is 
characteristic of European audiovisual policy in general – is that 
its main objectives seem to pull in two conflicting directions.   
The objectives for Media 2007-2013 are, first, to preserve 
and protect cultural diversity (CEC 2011b).  So this initiative 
is dirigiste in nature and intended to encourage wider dissemi-
nation to audiences of European-made audiovisual works than 
would be supported under free market circumstances. But, at 
the same time, a second key purpose of Media 2007-2013 is 
“to make the industry more competitive” (ibid) - to help re-
structure the European audiovisual industry so that it can com-
pete more effectively with US suppliers.  Some might argue 
that the provision of public grants for programme-makers to 
produce culturally worthy content, whatever the socio-cultural 
merits of so doing, is more likely to delay and prevent the de-
velopment of the necessary skills to compete in domestic and 
international markets than it is to foster improved competitive-
ness (Doyle 2002a: 165). The problem here is not so much 
that intervention is excessively driven by culture or by economic 
objectives per se but rather that its effectiveness is diluted to 
the extent that it is not sufficiently clear what exactly the MEDIA 
programme is fundamentally hoping to achieve. 
Competition and State Aid for Public Service Broadcast-
ers (PSBs)
Aside from content, the other main area where EU policy for the 
audiovisual sector has had a significant impact is competition. 
A number of EU rulings have emerged concerning, for example, 
bundling of television rights and or other forms of threatened 
or actual anti-competitive behaviour in markets for audiovisual. 
In the 1990s, the Competition Directorate was faced with a 
very large number of complaints and actions from commercial 
broadcasters across Europe who argued that the sizeable fund-
ing received every year by Europe’s PSBs amounted to ’state 
aid’ and therefore was in infringement of competition rules. 
State aid describes a situation where an administration finds 
reasons to, in some way, assist or give special financial support 
to particular businesses operating within their own national ter-
ritories.   It is about public authorities confering advantages on 
a selective basis to local companies and is generally prohibited 
under EU competition law. So these complaints resulted in a 
debate amongst European parliamentarians about the legitima-
cy of state aid for PSBs which, in turn, brought about the intro-
duction, via an addition to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, of 
a clause that recognises the special nature of broadcasting and 
therfore excludes PSBs from normal EU controls over state aid. 
The so-called “Amsterdam Protocol” was formalised through a 
subsequent Communication on PSBs and State Aid in 2001 
(CEC 2001)
However, the rapid pace of recent technological change in 
the media sector quickly called back into question the Com-
mission’s general approach on this issue. Growth of the inter-
net and the spread of digital technology has resulted in many 
PSBs across Europe successfully extending the scope of their 
activities across new platforms, fixed and mobile (Enli 2008; 
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Doyle 2010). The migration of public broadcasters towards a 
more multi-platform approach has given rise to new concerns 
about market dominance and unfair competition, this time be-
ing voiced not just by rival broadcasters but also newspaper 
publishing groups and other media content suppliers. The con-
cern is that PSBs use their public funding to invest not just in 
broadcasting (which is exempt from state aid rules) but also 
in new digital services (which are not exempt). The involve-
ment of well-funded PSB players in new media services has a 
crowding out affect on commercial rivals thus holding back the 
competitiveness of the European commercial audiovisual sector 
in a wider global context.
The Commission’s response was to bring forward a revised 
Communication on State Aid (CEC 2009). Under the revised 
rules, a new requirement has been introduced which means 
that each time a PSB entity decides it wishes to set up a “sig-
nificant” new media service a test needs to be carried out. A 
transparent evaluation is required, prior to any launch of a new 
service, to assess whether that new service is really justified 
in terms of delivering some positive value to public and also 
to consider what impact it may have on market. The require-
ment for national authorities to carry out a test was intended to 
strengthen the accountability of PSBs and help avoid “mission 
creep” on the part of PSBs, with expansion taking place on the 
basis of vague and over-ambitious digitilisation plans (Donders 
and Pauwels 2008).   
The revised Communication on State Aid and PSBs has, for 
now at least, staved off criticisms about the exemption of PSBs 
from normal competition rules. However, some voices in indus-
try have continued to express concern about the expansion of 
well-resourced PSB entities and have argued that the public 
value test lacks clarity and so is unlikely to be rigorous enough. 
From the point of view of newspaper publishers for example, 
the fact that PSBs are prolific suppliers of high quality news 
content that is available free of charge online has made it more 
difficult to erect paywalls around their own offerings. Another 
sort of concern raised is whether the costs of implementing the 
required public interest test will be too burdensome in smaller 
states (Donders and Pauwels 2008). Some critics argue that 
a hardened stance by the EU is symptomatic of an ongoing 
“hollowing out” of the powers of the state and a drift towards 
liberalization and marketisation at the expense of cultural priori-
ties (Wheeler 2010). 
Ownership and Pluralism
The concern that the Commission is not paying enough atten-
tion to protection of socio-cultural priorities associated with 
media is one that surfaces regularly in debates at European 
level about policy on ownership and cross-ownership of media 
and pluralism. On account of the prevalence of economies of 
scale and scope, there is a natural gravitation in media indus-
tries towards expansion, cross-sectoral diversification and mo-
nopolisation (Doyle 2002a: 22).  This of course raises issues 
in relation to competition and potential for abuses of dominant 
market positions and such problems are usually dealt with by 
the Competition Directorate of the EU.  But, in addition, media 
empire-building is controversial because of its impact on diver-
sity and pluralism. It is widely accepted that, in the interests 
of democracy and of social and cultural cohesion, individuals 
need plurality and diversity within media provision and there-
fore concentrations of ownership that narrow the range of voices 
predominating in the media need to be avoided.
One problem for regulators, whether at regional, national or 
pan-European level, is that ownership pattern in the media af-
fect not only pluralism but also how well firms in this industry 
are able to manage their resources and so, in turn, the efficiency 
and economic strength of the sector. The economic character-
istics of the industry naturally make it prone to monopolisation 
and cross-sectoral concentrations of ownership but, at the same 
time, concentrations of ownership are harmful because of the 
vital role played by media – television, newspapers, radio and 
the internet – in supplying the ideas that shape our viewpoints, 
our cultures and how we vote. So restrictions on ownership, 
while desirable from the point of view of curbing media empire-
building, may at the same time serve to prevent media organisa-
tions from growing their activities to whatever size and shape is 
conducive to maximising their efficiency and profits.
The history of attempts at EU-level to tackle regulation of me-
dia ownership and pluralism has been characterised by con-
flict, controversy and inaction (Doyle 2007). It might be argued 
that such inaction is not a problem because advances in digital 
technology and changing patterns of consumption obviate the 
need for special interventions to restrict media ownership for 
the sake of pluralism. Growth of the internet and social net-
working tools such as Facebook and Twitter have opened up 
increasing avenues for distribution of differing viewpoints and of 
media content of all sorts. But, despite digitization and growth 
of the internet, mainstream media brands and services still 
predominate within patterns of consumption to a surprisingly 
significant extent. For example, recent research conducted by 
UK regulator Ofcom confirms that, despite a changing media 
landscape, the vast people still get their news from television, 
radio and newspapers (Ofcom 2009:16). And a trend on the 
part of television and other media companies of moving more 
towards “multi-platform” production and dissemination has to 
some extent encouraged more recycling of content, which is 
harmful rather than positive for diversity (Doyle 2010). So, in 
fact, a new era of cross-platform expansion by established me-
dia players in response to digital convergence and growth of the 
internet serves to intensify rather than to obviate the need for 
interventions to protect media plurality.
Because media regulation at national level has not been par-
ticularly effective in preventing the development of powerful 
concentrations of ownership that are visible in most if not all 
European countries, the European Parliament has persistently 
over the years called upon the Commission to take action to 
curb media empires and to protect pluralism. In March 2011, 
Parliament reiterated this position by voting for the Commission 
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to bring forward new legislation to ensure adequate minimum 
levels of pluralism for EU citizens “before the end of the year” 
(EP 2011: Art 6). But the Commission has historically suffered 
from paralysis on the issue, partly because, as was confirmed 
when it consulted in the mid-1990s about a possible Directive 
on media ownership and pluralism, the wishes of Parliament for 
tighter curbs over media empire-building are in direct conflict 
with the desire of industry players for a liberalised framework 
in which contraints over expansion are minimised or removed. 
Another problem has been that the legal basis for intervention 
at European-level on media pluralism is doubtful – this is an 
issue that is supposed to be dealt with at national level. And 
a further difficulty is that, even if the Commission were em-
powered to enact the wishes of Parliament on this issue, there 
are very many practical obstacles to harmonisation of European 
media ownership rules because of the vast diversity of market 
sizes, resource levels and media histories in differing EU Mem-
ber States (Doyle 2002b). So as far as ownership and pluralism 
are concerned, it seems very doubtful whether any meaningful 
action will be forthcoming in the near future.
Conclusions
To be fair to the policy-making institutions of the European Un-
ion, it should be conceded that designing policies for audio-
visual and media industries is always challenging. These indus-
tries are, quite naturally, affected by “normal” economic and 
industrial policy considerations to do with growth, employment, 
efficiency etc. But in addition, audiovisual policy has to take 
account of an array of ‘special’ concerns and considerations 
that stem the socio-political and cultural importance of com-
munications. There is no obvious way that policy-makers can 
balance or offset these competing priorities against one another. 
As has been noted by economists such as Alan Peacock who 
have worked on television policy, whatever the differing welfare 
impacts that alternative policy choices could give rise to, it is 
exceedingly difficult to pinpoint these impacts and bring within 
the framework of any kind of satisfactory quantitative analysis 
(Peacock 1996).
Another related problem is that different constituencies with 
a stake in audiovisual media provision —television sharehold-
ers, senior management, employees, journalists, advertisers, 
citizens, audiences, “the public”— are likely to have different 
ideas about what the purposes of regulation are, or ought to 
be. This may be partially true of any industry but it is especially 
true of sectors involved in cultural provision, such as media. 
Everyone feels they have a stake and public expectations about 
what objectives public policy ought to pursue can be extremely 
wide-ranging and at times contradictory.
When it comes to assessing economic policy for audiovisual 
industries in a European context then all the usual complexi-
ties and contradictions associated with communications and 
cultural industries become overlaid by politics. And it is not 
only the transnational politics of different member states (with 
their very different histories, media systems and viewpoints) 
that need to be negotiated but also the differing positions taken 
by the various institutions of the EU and different factions within 
those individual institutions (Collins 1994). Taking these dif-
ficulties into account, it stands as a positive achievement that 
the Commission has, over the years, managed to bring forward 
several collective policies in the areas of media and audiovisual. 
And indeed some aspects of EU media and communications 
policy have proven quite influential, e.g. technical standards, 
e-commerce and liberalisation of telecoms.
However, as evidenced by the areas of intervention considered 
in this article, conflicting agendas have left a marked impression 
across the Commission’s efforts to draw up policies in the area 
of audiovisual. Just as key landmarks – the AVMS Directive, 
the MEDIA programme and, to an extent, the Communication 
on PSBs and State Aid – reflect compromise between, on the 
one hand, a desire to liberalise and promote the economic com-
petitiveness of indigenous European players and, on the other, 
a wish to intervene to protect against the effects of liberalization 
and the unhampered forces of the free market, each also stands 
open to criticism for lacking a clear enough sense of direction 
and for failing to advance effectively any of the public policy 
objectives associated with audiovisual media, be they socio-
cultural or economic in their nature.
 
The challenges facing audiovisual regulators have been made 
more complex by ongoing advances in technology. More av-
enues for distribution and greater interactivity on digital plat-
forms continue to transform markets for audiovisual supply and 
consumption and the challenge of adjusting policy to the newly 
emerging competitive market circumstances has proven to be 
testing, as demonstrated by the lengthy debate and controver-
sy which proceeded final agreement on the scope of the new 
AVMS Directive in 2007. Whereas support for content via the 
subsidies offered throught the MEDIA programme has been a 
central plank of European audiovisual policy to date, ensuring 
appropriate incentives to promote the commercial development 
of Europe’s audiovisual content providers is likely to call for new 
sorts of initiatives in future.     
Historically, the main areas of EU intervention in relation to 
audiovisual arena have been content and competition.  In fu-
ture, copyright will assume greater importance. This is signalled 
in a range of copyright-related issues that, alongside promoting 
the roll-out of high-speed broadband across Europe, constitute 
the “Digital Agenda” (CEC 2010b) of aims the EU wishes to 
achieve by 2020. The Murphy case has also highlighted ways 
in which the framework of coordination of copyright across Eu-
rope requires adjustment to the greater cross-frontier circulation 
of audiovisual services made possible by the digital era.  But 
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on the question of copyright, as with virtually all media-related 
policy issues, tensions between differing ideological positions 
and interest groups represent a much more likely source of im-
pediment to the Commission’s work in drafting European-wide 
solutions than changing technologies. On copyright, some take 
the view that the assumptions underlying traditional copyright 
law are out-of-date and apt to stifle innovation whereas oth-
ers argue that continued strong protections for copyright remain 
vital to the successful development of Europe’s audiovisual con-
tent supply industries, notwithstanding digital platforms.  
Although the threats and opportunities caused by digitisa-
tion and by disruption to the value chain will undoubtedly add 
complexity to the task the Commission faces in regulating au-
diovisual as time goes on, the history of intervention in this 
arena clearly suggests that negotiating the conflicting agendas 
surrounding audiovisual media represent a much more likely 
source of challenge to progress for policy-making at EU level.
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